Just another essay so that everyone feels my pain

Lately I am stuck up to my eyeballs in essays. I seem to eat, sleep, breathe, and dream essays. The fact that the deadlines are nearing and I will soon be free of them only pushes me toward panic. It does nothing to alleviate the stress. So, since I don’t have time to write much else and academic misery loves company I present you with what I hope is a thought-provoking piece on the circumstances of the modern identity.

Identity in Modern Sociological Thinking

“Who are you?” said the Caterpillar.This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice replied, rather shyly, “I—I hardly know, Sir, just at present—at least I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been changed several times since then.”

(Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, pp.40-41)

The question of ‘why the concept of identity[1] has become so significant in contemporary social thought’ is a question that can be answered in many ways, and there is little doubt that no one answer would wholly suffice. Having said that, the assertion this essay will to put forth is that identity is of eminent concern to modern social thinkers (and, indeed, society as a whole) because modern life places the responsibility for its formation and maintenance on the individual in previously unprecedented ways. The individual is expected to carry out this responsibility in an increasingly pluralistic and uncertain environment this, in turn fosters fear and anxiety. While often unnoticed, it is this anxiety that keeps the concept of identity from fading away.

That identity is of real concern in the social sciences is widely acknowledged. In 2000, Dennis Wrong wrote “one has the impression that ‘identity’ is the most widely used concept these days in the social sciences and humanities from which it has passed into popular discourse[2] (p. 10).” The next year Anthony Elliot beat the same drum in his book Concept of the Self, “the emergent direction of contemporary social theory is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the attention it lavishes upon the nature of the self, self-identity, and individual subjectivity (p. 8).” The year after that it was Mervyn Bendle who said, “the concept of ‘identity’ is central to much contemporary sociological analysis (p. 1),” and this year Lauren Leve (p. 1) made much the same claim for anthropology: “ “Identity” is a key term for anthropological analysis today.”

But what is it about the subject of identity that has gripped the minds and pens of writers and readers today? Could it be just as Lawler (2008, p. 1) claims when she writes that the idea of ‘identity’ is at the core of many of the troubles plaguing contemporary Western cultures? Perhaps, but this runs the risk of reductionism, and as she spent the next 148 pages of her book, Identity: Sociological Perspectives, further interrogating these problems, it is relatively safe to say Lawler would think so too.

Further, the question that is reasonably answered with ‘it’s at the heart of our problems’ is not quite the same as the one that asks what about it, identity, places it at the heart of Anglophone cultural denigration, as Lawler states. It would be more accurate to say that there are concerns with identity itself. Discourses around identity are generally accompanied by cries of ‘crisis’ (Erikson 1968), ‘loss’ (Weigert & Hastings 1977), ‘failure’ (Rose 1987), ‘disorder’ (Kluft & Foote 1999), ‘confusion’ (Tomlinson 1999), and ‘trouble’ (Lawler 2008).

Dennis Wrong (2000, p. 1) states the problem facing many modern individuals and their identity concisely: “identity reflects the freedom and mobility available under conditions of modernity, confronting individuals with a wide array of choices and holding them responsible for those that are made, which inevitably leads to uncertainties, regrets, and illusory sense of achievements, or outright “anomie” and “alienation” on the part of many people.” This has not always been the case, however.

Pre-modern identity was linked to one’s position in the social hierocracy (Baumeister 1991) and essentially fixed at birth. In what Parsons calls ascription (Abbott 1998, p. 23), a person inherited their status from their family, and almost everyone you encountered on a daily basis knew you and the family that spawned you. There was very little you could do to change this, and there was, therefore, no reason to give it much thought. “There was little sense of self-doubt, self-awareness, inner processes, or identity crisis (Baumeister 1991, p. 95).”

This changed with the industrial and democratic revolutions of the 1800s (Bendle 2002). The rise of the industrialized, urban community allowed slack into the societal guidelines and traditional regulations that had maintained the ill-thought and predominantly unnoticed ‘identity’ (for surely they had one even if no one had, yet, thought to investigate it) of pre-modern man.

This relaxing, or outright breakdown (Obeyesekere 1995), of the rules and codes of people’s lives (Bauman 2000, p. 7) provides modern people an almost limitless degree of freedom that was unheard of in previous generations (Baumeister & Muraven 1996, p. 406). This freedom came with a price, however. The modern identity is much more difficult and problematic than the identities of the past (Baumeister 1991, p. 77) because roles are no longer given. They are no longer something an individual is born with and need not expend energy thinking about. They must now be achieved through a series of deliberate demanding choices (Schwartz 2004, p. 110), individual ability, and effort (Abbott 1998). They must be personal and discovered for oneself (Taylor 1994), “sought, striven for, and forged out of fragments (Wrong 2000, p. 11),” by jural individuals (Lambek & Antze 1996, p. xxi). Establishing an identity has become an arduous epic quest.

As such there are some for whom this freedom to choose is instead a burden of choice (Schwartz 2004, Baumeister 1992). However, even for those who do not feel the weight of the task, for whom it is truly considered a right rather than an obligation, it is an ever-present reality. “Individuals must continually strive to be more efficient, faster, leaner, inventive and self-actualizing than they were previously—not sporadically, but day-in day-out (Elliot & Lamert 2006, p. 3).” People are required to exercise creative intelligence (Gross 2005, p. 292), finding or creating the rules to utilise “in a bricolage of their own identities (Lash 1999, p. 3).”

Richard Sennett called this ability to define one’s own individual identity the ‘privatization of personality’ (Abbott 1998, p. 83), and while this does allow people a far wider ability to ‘choose, change and adapt’ their identities, it also increases the pressure to do so (Baumeister & Muraven 1996). This is further complicated by the increased plurality of Western Society, which vastly increases the number of choices that have to be made (Beck & Lau 2005, p. 536) by providing a dizzying array of role, value and identity choices, but few obvious signposts to indicate how to make these choices.

These directional markers have been refer to as ‘value bases’ and are defined as values deemed right or good without any further justification (Baumeister 1991, Baumeister & Muraven 1996). They can, therefore, be held up as exemplary when future identity choices are required. Value bases not only serve to instruct individuals in proper decision making, in doing so they also accord those choices, and the ones making them, with value. Their loss can leave a decision maker uncertain about the right course of action, but also doubting the meaning of their decisions, regardless of what they may be. If there is no right or wrong answer, what does the eventual decision matter? This can lead to a feeling of insipid, vacuous meaninglessness, or identity confusion (Tomlinson 1999) about the choices they face. Schwartz (1995, p. 71) vividly describes the scenario as “Migrants of identity wander[ing] the land, trying on this or that identity, never sure, and perhaps under the circumstances, unable to attain familiar forms of authenticity.”

Constructing a value base is particularly slow and difficult in modern society (Seligman 1998). Unfortunately, detraditionalization[3] quickly and easily destroys them, creating a ‘value gap (Baumeister and Muraven 1996).’ Baumeister (1991, p.6) has called this gap “the single biggest problem for the Modern Western individual in making life meaningful.” He goes on to note “a major part of the modern response to this value gap is to elevate selfhood and the cultivation of identity into basic, compelling values.”

It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss in depth what has historically functioned as value bases. However, Baumeister (1991) has noted the most influential of them to have been religion, morality and tradition. As these have weakened with the encroachment of modernity others have been tested to replace them. Examples include the work ethic, the sacredness of the family, and parenthood (Baumeister and Muraven 1996). The most successful, however, and the one to be discussed here is the elevation of the self into a value base.

Because this puts morality and self-interest in the same basket for the first time (Baumeister & Muraven 1996, p. 410), some critics have called this focus on the self or identity egoism and narcissism. But as Elliot and Lamert (2006, p. 5) rightly state, these terms are too broad to be of use. Such allegations also miss the importance of the social scenario that necessitated the shift in value bases to begin with. Modern society has been struggling with fewer ways of justifying things as right and good (Baumeister 1991). Facing a series of value gaps that rendered decision making more difficult, or rather baseless and base, Moderns looked inward, to their new individualized[4] selves, for something that would give life meaning. They used the self to justify their actions (Baumeister 1992).  This had the side effect of intensifying the importance of self-understanding.

Dennis Wrong (2000, p. 11) notes that most discussions about identity or self-understanding start with the question “Who am I?” Recently the question has been problematically recast as “Who am I really (Schwartz 1995, p. 71)?” This makes identity formation more difficult, as the self has been occluded. Should the answer to the second question be different that the first, this infers a deceptive, untrustworthy (Bendle 2002) aspect to identity that can leave the already frustrated identity-seeker uncertain of having attained the desired outcome. This leaves individuals anxious and uncertain, and leads to identity formation within a high stakes, endless project (Rose 1999).

The identity-project is a concept attributed to “Britain’s preeminent social theorist (Elliot 2003, p. 135),” Anthony Giddens. It refers to the process by which people create self-identity as a ‘reflexive project,’ “the reflexivity of modern social life consists in the fact that social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character (Giddens 1990, p. 38).” In other words, individuals can monitor and manage the development of their identity. If they feel that they are lacking in some manner they can take action to rectify this (Abbott 1998, p. 131). This is problematic in two ways. Firstly, it never ends. There is no reprieve. Secondly, it opens Pandora’s box of fear of failure.

Failing in this task in injurious in two ways. The first is as a condemnable failure on the part of the individual. There are high expectations that surround the development of identity, this entails a greater vulnerability to failure and such constant vulnerability is a source of anxiety (Baumeister 1992, p. 23). The second is a fear that should others also fail to successfully develop a concrete identity, there will be a lack of self-regulation. As an example, the modern proliferation of personal surveillance equipment can be seen as a symptom of this fear. It is utilized to further induce self-regulation in environments where it is thought to be lacking (Staples, 2000). Foulcault’s understood this, in discussing his theory of panopticism wrote, “He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection (Foulcault 1995, 202-203).”

This idea of self-regulation has become the responsibility of the individual along with identity formation. “Self-regulation is a highly adaptive, distinctively human trait that enables people to override and alter their responses, including changing themselves so as to live up to social and other standards… [it] is an important personality process by which people seek to exert control over their thoughts, their feelings, their impulses and appetites, and their task performances (Baumeister, Gailliot, et al. 2006, p. 1774).” It is not, however universally and equally applied, and failure to self-regulate (seen as a symptom of weak identity formation) is thought to be central to a majority of social and personal problems plaguing citizens in modern Western societies (Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice 1994).

Foulcault argued that “the self is coerced into existence, not to become an agent but as a mechanism of control where systems of discourse work from the inside out by creating a self regulating subject … In other words, the self at its most basic level is a reflexive process that regulates the acting, argentic organism (Callero 2003, pp. 118-120).” Since these internal controls work by limiting what is considered meaningful, Gross (2005, p. 296) calls them meaning-constitutive traditions[5]. They limit what can be voiced (both openly and to oneself) thereby “influencing the thinkability [sic] of particular acts and projects.” Lawler (2008, p. 56) makes a similar point while discussing Foulcault’s juridical versus regulatory powers. She states that over the last 150 years there has been a move from juridical or law-like powers, which uses the language of rights and obligations, to forms of normalizing or regulatory[6] power, which uses the language of health, self-fulfilment and normality. If juridical power ‘says’ obey me or you will be punished’, regulatory powers ‘says’ obey me so that you can be happy, healthy, and fulfilled’…It is a form of power which does not rely on external coercion, but in which we scrutinize, regulate and discipline ourselves—the self comes to act on itself.

This acting on oneself to formulate and regulate the ‘self’ is an endless project; one that is deemed to be of exceptional importance, requires constant attention, has no designated end date, and no clear indication of what success looks like. In the modern West this endless reflexive project of developing, nurturing, and regulating a sense of identity has become a core social component. It is a regulative task they engage in daily, and this engagement has become meaningful in itself.

“The modern preoccupation with identity is therefore more than a mere reflection of some particular difficulties about it. Instead, the preoccupation gains urgency and force because people look to identity to help make life meaningful (Baumeister & Muraven 1996, p. 410).” However, this is a heavy burden for one concept (and possible actuality) to carry. While it, undoubtedly, solves some problems, filling value gaps for example, it creates others. Fear and anxiety abound in the realm of mission oriented identity formation. This anxiety, stemming from the constant need to fulfil ones responsibilities of identity formation and management, keeps the concept of identity central to modern sociological thinking, and barring drastic social change, is likely to continue doing so well into the future.

[1] The meaning of identity is contentious and crosses a myriad of disciplines (Appiah and Gates 1995). In the words of Stephanie Lawler (2008, p.1), “more or less everyone knows more or less what it means.” While this may be true, it also means that the term can mean too much, too little, or nothing at all depending on how one looks at it (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p.1). As this essay seeks to address the concept in any form, a limiting definition was not deemed necessary.

[2] Just as Wrong predicted, writing on identity can be found spilling from such non-academic presses as Vogue (Poletti, 2011 & Barnett, 2008), Playboy (Pogue, 2005), and New Identity Magazine (a faith-based magazine claiming to help people “find their new identity in Christ”). Possibly more perplexing is True: Identity, Beauty, Impact (www.truecampaign.org), who aim to provide news concerning our culture’s views on identity and beauty, but whose intended readership is the bulimic and anorexic.

[3] A theory attributed to Anthony Giddens, in his 1991 book Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. It has been defined as the “abandonment or reconfiguration of sociological traditions that had previously been in place … [and] a general decline in traditional action (Gross 2005, p. 287).”

[4] For more on the cause, affects, and effects of individualism see Elliot, A. and Lamert, C. (2006) The New Individualism: The Emotional Costs of Globalization, Oxon: Routledge.

[5] This is opposed to regulative traditions. Though they can be internalized, regulative traditions influence action “from the outside” (Gross 2005) with threats of exclusion or expulsion from the group.

[6] There appears to be a slight contradiction in Gross’ use of the term ‘regulative’ and Lawler’s (Foucault’s) use of the term ‘regulatory’.

Works Cited

Abbott, David. Culture and Identity. Oxon: Hodder & Stoughton Educational, 1998.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony, and Henry Louis Gates. Identities. Chicago: Univeresity of Chicago Press, 1995.

Barnett, Leisa. “A Question of Identity: Bruno Pieters Talks Identity.” Vogue.co.uk. 30 Sept 2008. www.vogue.co.uk/news/2008/09/30/bruno-pieters-talks-identity (accessed Dec 15, 2011).

Bauman, Zygman. Liquid Modernity. Camridge: Polity, 2000.

Baumeister, Roy F. Meanings of Life. New York: Guilford Press, 1991.

Baumeister, Roy F. “Neglected Aspects of Self-Theory: Motivation, Interpersonal Aspects, Culture, Escape, and Existential Value.” Psychological Inquiry 2, no. 1 (1992): 21-25.

Baumeister, Roy F, and Mark Muraven. “Identity As Adaptation To Social, Cultural and Historical Context.” Journal of Adolescence 19 (1996): 405-416.

Baumeister, Roy F, Matthew Gailliot, Nathan C DeWall, and Megan Oaten. “Self-Regulation and Personality: How Interventions Increase Regulatory Success, and How Depletion Moderates the Effects of Traits on Behavior.” Journal of Personality 74, no. 6 (2006): 1774-1802.

Baumeister, Roy F, T F Heatherton, and D M Tice. Losing Control: How and Why People Fail at Self-Regulation. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1994.

Beck, Ulrich, and Christoph Lau. “Second Modernity As a Research Agenda: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations In the ‘Meta-change’ Of Modern Society.” The British Journal of Sociology 56, no. 4 (2005): 525-557.

Bendle, Mervyn F. “The Crisis of ‘Identity’ in High Modernity.” British Journal of Sociology (Routledge) 53, no. 1 (March 2002): 1-18.

Bloch, Alice, and John Solomos. Race and Ethnicity in the 21st Century. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010.

Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. “Beyond “Identity”.” Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (Feb 2000): 1-47.

Callero, Peter L. “The Sociology of the Self.” Annual Review Sociology 29 (2003): 115-133.

Carroll, Lewis. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass. New York, NY: Penguin, 2009 (Original published in 1865).

Elliot, Anthony. “Anthony Giddems.” In Key Contemporary Social Theorists, by Anthony Elliott and Larry Ray, 135-140. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

—. Concept of the Self. Cambridge: Polity, 2001.

Elliot, Anthony, and Charles Lamert. The New Individualism: The Emotional Costs of Globalization. Oxon: Routledge, 2006.

Foulcault, Michael. Discipline and Punishment. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995 (Original published in 1975).

Giddens, Anthony. Modernity and Self Identity: Selfand Society in the Late Modern Age. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991.

—. The consequences of Modernity . Cambridge: Polity, 1990.

Gilroy, P. Between Camps. London: Allen Lane, 2000.

Gross, Neil. “The Detraditionalization of Intimacy Reconsidered.” Sociological Theory (American Sociological Association) 23, no. 3 (Sept. 2005): 286-311.

Kluft, R, and B Foote. “Dissociative Identity Disorider.” American Journal fo Psychotherapy 53, no. 3 (1999): 1-19.

Lambek, M, and Paul Antze. “Introduction: Forcasting Memory.” In Tense Past Cultural Essays In Trauma and Memory, by M Lambek and Paul Antze. London: Routledge, 1996.

Lash, S. Another Modernity, A Differnt Raionality. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

Lawler, Steph. Identity: Sociological Perspectives. Cambridge: Polity, 2008.

Leve, Lauren. “Identity.” Current Anthropology 52, no. 4 (August 2011): 513-535.

New Identity Magazine. New Identity Magazine. http://www.newidentitymagazine.com/about/ (accessed Dec 15, 2011).

Obeyesekere, Gananath. “On Buddhidt Identity in Sri Lanka.” In Ethni Identity: Creation, Conflict, and Accommodation, by Lola Romanucci-Ross and George DeVos. London: Altamira Press, 1995.

Pogue, Joey W. “New perspectives on masculinity through an examination of the “Playboy” advisor column: A grounded theory approach .” Columbia, MO: University of Missouri – Columbia, 2005. 322.

Poletti, Federico. “In Search of Identity.” Vogue Italia, Oct 2011.

Portez, Alejandr, and Ruben G Rumbaut. Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. New York: Russell Sage, 2001.

Rose, J. “Femininity and Its Discontents.” In Feminist Review Sexuality: A Reader. London: Virago, 1987.

Rose, Nicolas. Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self. London: Routledge, 1999.

Schwartz, Barry. The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less. New York: Harper Collins, 2004.

Schwartz, Theodore. “Cultural Totoemism: Ethnic Identity Primitive and Modern.” In Ethnic Identity, by Lola Ross-Romanucci and George DeVos, 48-72. London: Sage, 1995.

Seligman, Adam B. “Trust and Sociability: ON the Limits of Cinfidence and Role Expectations.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology (American Journal of Economics and Sociology Inc) 57, no. 4 (Oct 1998): 391-404.

Staples, WG. Everyday Surveillance: Vigilance and Visibility In Postmodern Life. Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 2000.

Taylor, Charles. “The Politics of Recognition.” In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, edited by Amy Gutmann. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Tomlinson, J. Globalization and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Weigert, Andrew, and Ross Hastings. “Identity Loss, Family, and Social Change.” American Journal Of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1171-1185.

Wrong, Dennis. “Adversarial Identities and Multicilturalism.” Society 37, no. 2 (Jan/Feb 2000): 10-14.

 

Leave a Reply